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1 From probability theory to Kolmogorov com-
plexity
1.1 Randomness and Probability theory
Quisani1: I just found a surprising assertion on Leonid Levin’s home page:
While fundamental in many areas of Science, randomness is re-
ally “native” to Computer Science.
Common sense would rather consider randomness as intrinsically relevant
to Probability theory!
Authors: Levin also adds: “The computational nature of randomness was
clarified by Kolmogorov.”
The point is that, from its very origin to modern axiomatization around
1933 [21] by Andrei Nikolaievitch Kolmogorov (1903–1987), Probability the-
ory carries a paradoxical result:
if we toss an unbiaised coin 100 times then 100 heads are just as
probable as any other outcome!
As Peter Ga´cs pleasingly remarks ([17], p. 3), this convinces us only that the
axioms of Probability theory, as developped in [21], do not solve all mysteries
that they are sometimes supposed to.
In fact, since Laplace, much work has been devoted to get a mathematical
theory of random objects, notably by Richard von Mises (1883–1953) (cf.
§8.2). But none was satisfactory up to the 60’s when such a theory emerged
on the basis of computability.
As it sometimes occurs, the theory was discovered by several authors inde-
pendently.2 In the USA, Ray J. Solomonoff (b. 1926), 1964 [42] (a paper
submitted in 1962) and Gregory J. Chaitin (b. 1947), 1966 [5], 1969 [6]
(both papers submitted in 1965). In Russia, Kolmogorov, 1965 [23], with
premisses announced in 1963 [22].
Q: Same phenomenon as for hyperbolic geometry with Gauss, Lobatchevski
and Bolyai. I recently read a citation from Bolyai’s father: “When the time is
ripe for certain things, these things appear in different places in the manner
of violets coming to light in early spring”.
1Quisani is a student with quite eclectic scientific curiosity, who works under Yuri
Gurevich’s supervision
2For a detailed analysis of who did what, and when, see [30] p.89–92.
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A: Mathematics and poetry. . .Well, pioneered by Kolmogorov, Martin-Lo¨f,
Levin, Ga´cs, Schnorr (in Europe) and Chaitin, Solovay (in America), the
theory developped very fruitfully and is now named Kolmogorov complexity
or Algorithmic Information Theory.
Q: So, Kolmogorov founded Probability Theory twice! In the 30’s and then
in the 60’s.
A: Hum. . . In the 30’s Kolmogorov axiomatized Probability Theory on the
basis of measure theory, i.e. integration theory on abstract spaces. In the
60’s, Kolmogorov (and also Solomonoff and Chaitin independently) founded
a mathematical theory of randomness. That it could be a new basis for
Probability Theory is not clear.
Q: What? Randomness would not be the natural basis for Probability
Theory?
A: Random numbers are useful in different kinds of applications: simu-
lations of natural phenomena, sampling for testing “typical case”, getting
good source of data for algorithms, . . . (cf. Donald Knuth, [20], chapter 3).
However, the notion of random object as a mathematical notion is presently
ignored in lectures about Probability Theory. Be it for the foundations or for
the development of Probability Theory, such a notion is neither introduced
nor used. That’s the way it is. . . There is a notion of random variable, but it
has really nothing to do with random objects. Formally, they are just func-
tions over some probability space. The name “random variable” is a mere
vocable to convey the underlying non formalized intuition of randomness.
Q: That’s right. I attended several courses on Probability Theory. Never
heard anything precise about random objects. And, now that you tell me, I
realize that there was something strange for me with random variables.
So, finally, our concrete experience of chance and randomness on which
we build so much intuition is simply removed from the formalization of
Probability Theory.
Hum. . . Somehow, it’s as if the theory of computability and programming
were omitting the notion of program, real programs.
By the way, isn’ it the case? In recursion theory, programs are reduced to
mere integers: Go¨del numbers!
A: Sure, recursion theory illuminates but does not exhaust the subject of
programming.
As concerns a new foundation of Probability Theory, it’s already quite
remarkable that Kolmogorov has looked at his own work on the subject with
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such a distance. So much as to come to a new theory: the mathematization
of randomness. However, it seems (to us) that Kolmogorov has been am-
biguous on the question of a new foundation. Indeed, in his first paper on
the subject (1965, [23], p. 7), Kolmogorov briefly evoked that possibility :
. . . to consider the use of the [Algorithmic Information Theory]
constructions in providing a new basis for Probability Theory.
However, later (1983, [25], p. 35–36), he separated both topics
“there is no need whatsoever to change the established construc-
tion of the mathematical probability theory on the basis of the
general theory of measure. I am not enclined to attribute the
significance of necessary foundations of probability theory to the
investigations [about Kolmogorov complexity] that I am now go-
ing to survey. But they are most interesting in themselves.
though stressing the role of his new theory of random objects for mathemat-
ics as a whole ([25], p. 39):
The concepts of information theory as applied to infinite se-
quences give rise to very interesting investigations, which, with-
out being indispensable as a basis of probability theory, can ac-
quire a certain value in the investigation of the algorithmic side
of mathematics as a whole.”
Q: All this is really exciting. Please, tell me about this approach to ran-
domness.
1.2 Intuition of finite random strings and Berry’s paradox
A: OK. We shall first consider finite strings.
If you don’t mind, we can start with an approach which actually fails but
conveys the basic intuitive idea of randomness. Well, just for a while, let’s
say that a finite string u is random if there is no shorter way to describe u
but give the successive symbols which constitute u. Saying it otherwise, the
shortest description of u is u itself, i.e. the very writing of the string u.
Q: Something to do with intensionality and extensionality?
A: You are completely right. Our tentative definition declares a finite string
to be random just in case it does not carry any intensionality. So that there
is no description of u but the extensional one, which is u itself.
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Q: But the notion of description is somewhat vague. Is it possible to be
more precise about “description” and intensionality?
A: Diverse partial formalizations are possible. For instance within any par-
ticular logical first-order structure. But they are quite far from exhausting
the intuitive notion of definability. In fact, the untamed intuitive notion
leads to paradoxes, much as the intuition of truth.
Q: I presume you mean the liar paradox as concerns truth. As for defin-
ability, it should be Berry’s paradox about
“the smallest integer not definable in less than eleven words”
and this integer is indeed defined by this very sentence containing only 10
words.
A: Yes, these ones precisely. By the way, this last paradox was first men-
tioned by Bertrand Russell, 1908 ([38], p.222 or 150) who credited G.G.
Berry, an Oxford librarian, for the suggestion.
1.3 Kolmogorov complexity relative to a function
Q: And how can one get around such problems?
A: What Solomonoff, Kolmogorov and Chaitin did is a very ingenious move:
instead of looking for a general notion of definability, they restricted it to
computability. Of course, computability is a priori as much a vague and
intuitive notion as is definability. But, as you know, since the thirties, there
is a mathematization of the notion of computability.
Q: Thanks to Kurt, Alan and Alonzo.3
A: Hum. . .Well, with such a move, general definitions of a string u are
replaced by programs which compute u.
Q: Problem: we have to admit Church’s thesis.
A: OK. In fact, even if Church’s thesis were to break down, the theory of
computable functions would still remain as elegant a theory as you learned
from Yuri and other people. It would just be a formalization of a proper
part of computability, as is the theory of primitive recursive functions or
elementary functions. As concerns Kolmogorov theory, it would still hold
and surely get extension to such a new context.
3Kurt Go¨del (1906–1978), Alan Mathison Turing (1912–1954), Alonzo Church (1903–
1995).
6
Q: But where do the programs come from? Are you considering Turing
machines or some programming language?
A: Any partial computable function A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is considered as
a programming language. The domain of A is seen as a family of programs,
the value A(p) — if there is any — is the output of program p. As a whole,
A can be seen both as a language to write programs and as the associated
operational semantics.
Now, Kolmogorov complexity relative to A is the function KA : {0, 1}∗ → N
which maps a string x to the length of shortest programs which output x:
Definition 1. KA(x) = min{|p| : A(p) = x}
(Convention: min(∅) = +∞, so that KA(x) = +∞ if x is outside the range
of A).
Q: This definition reminds me of a discussion I had with Yuri some years
ago ([19] p.76–78). Yuri explained me things about Levin complexity. I
remember it involved time.
A: Yes. Levin complexity is a very clever variant of K which adds to the
length of the program the log of the computation time to get the output.
It’s a much finer notion. We shall not consider it for our discussion about
randomness. You’ll find some developments in [30] §7.5.
Q: There are programs and outputs. Where are the inputs?
A: We can do without inputs. It’s true that functions with no argument
are not considered in mathematics, but in computer science, they are. In
fact, since Von Neumann, we all know that there can be as much tradeof
as desired between input and program. This is indeed the basic idea for
universal machines and computers.
Nevertheless, Kolmogorov [23] points a natural role for inputs when consid-
ering conditional Kolmogorov complexity in a sense very much alike that of
conditional probabilities.
To that purpose, consider a partial computable function B : {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. A pair (p, y) in the domain of B is interpreted as a
program p together with an input y. And B(p, y) is the output of program
p on input y. Kolmogorov [23] defines the conditional complexity relative
to B as the function KB( | ) : {0, 1}∗ ×{0, 1}∗ → N which maps strings x, y
to the length of shortest programs which output x on input y:
Definition 2. KB(x | y) = min{|p| : B(p, y) = x}
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1.4 Why binary programs?
Q: Programs should be binary strings?
A: This is merely a reasonable restriction.
Binary strings surely have some flavor of machine level programming. But
this has nothing to do with the present choice. In fact, binary strings just
allow for a fairness condition. The reason is that Kolmogorov complexity
deals with lengthes of programs. Squaring or cubing the alphabet divides
all lengthes by 2 or 3 as we see when going from binary to octal or hex-
adecimal. So that binary representation of programs is merely a way to get
an absolute measure of length. If we were to consider programs p written
in some finite alphabet Σ, we would have to replace the length |p| by the
product |p| log(card(Σ)) where card(Σ) is the number of symbols in Σ. This
is an important point when comparing Kolmogorov complexities associated
to diverse programming languages, cf. 2.1.
1.5 What about other possible outputs?
Q: Outputs should also be binary strings?
A: Of course not. In Kolmogorov approach, outputs are the finite objects
for which a notion of randomness is looked for. Binary strings constitute a
simple instance. One can as well consider integers, or rationals or elements
of any structure D with a natural notion of computability. The modification
is straightforward: now A is a partial computable function A : {0, 1}∗ → D
and KA : D → N is defined in the same way: KA(x), for x ∈ D, is the
minimum length of a program p such that f(p) = x.
2 Optimal Kolmogorov complexity
2.1 The Invariance Theorem
Q: Well, for each partial computable function A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ (or
A : {0, 1}∗ → D, as you just explained) there is an associated Kolmogorov
complexity. So, what is the Kolmogorov complexity of a given string? It
depends on the chosen A.
A: Now, comes the fundamental result of the theory, the so-called invariance
theorem. We shall state it uniquely for Kolmogorov complexity but it also
holds for conditional Kolmogorov complexity.
Recall the enumeration theorem: partial computable functions can be enu-
merated in a partial computable way. This means that there exists a partial
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computable function E : N × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that, for every par-
tial computable function A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, there is some e ∈ N for
which we have ∀p A(p) = E(e, p) (equality means that A(p) and E(e, p) are
simultaneously defined or not and, if defined, of course they must be equal).
Q: Wait, wait, I remember the diagonal argument which proves that there is
no enumeration of functions N → N. It goes through computability. Given
E : N × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, the function A : N → N such that A(n) =
E(n, n) + 1 is different from each one of the function n 7→ E(n, e)’s. And if
E is computable then A is computable.
So, how can there be an enumeration of computable functions?
A: There is no computable enumeration of computable functions. The
diagonal argument you recalled proves that this is impossible. No way.
But, we are not considering computable functions but partial computable
functions. This makes a big difference. The diagonal argument breaks down.
In fact, equality E(n, n) = E(n, n)+1 is not incoherent: it just insures that
E(n, n) is not defined!
Q: Very strange property,indeed.
A: No, no. It’s quite intuitive nowadays, in our world with computers.
Given a program in some fixed programming language, say language LISP,
an interpreter executes it. Thus, with one more argument, the simulated
program, the LISP compiler enumerates all functions which can be computed
by a LISP program. Now, any partial computable function admits a LISP
program. Thus, the LISP interpreter gives you a computable enumeration
of computable functions.
Q: OK.
A: Let’s go back to the invariance theorem. We transform E into a one
argument partial computable function U : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ as follows: Set{
U(0e1p) = E(e, p)
U(q) = undefined if q contains no occurrence of 1
(where 0e is the string 00...0 with length e).
Then, if A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is partial computable and e0 is such that
∀p A(p) = E(e0, p), we have
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KU (x) = min{|q| : U(q) = x} (definition of KU )
= min{|0e1p| : U(0e1p) = x}
≤ min{|0e01p| : U(0e01p) = x} (restriction to e = e0)
= min{|0e01p| : A(p) = x} (e is a code for A)
= e+ 1 +min{|p| : A(p) = x}
= e+ 1 +KA(x) (definition of KA)
Let’s introduce useful notations. For f, g : {0, 1}∗ → N, let’s write
f ≤ g +O(1) (resp. f = g +O(1))
to mean that there exists a constant c such that
∀x f(x) ≤ g(x) + c (resp. ∀x |f(x)− g(x)| ≤ c)
i.e. f is smaller than (resp. equal to) g up to an additive constant c.
What we have just shown can be expressed as the following theorem
independently obtained by Kolmogorov (1965 [23] p.5), Chaitin (1966 [5]
§9-11) and Solomonoff (1964 [42] p.12, who gives the proof as an informal
argument).
Theorem 3 (Invariance theorem). KU ≤ KA + O(1) for any partial
computable A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. In other words, up to an additive constant,
KU is the smallest one among the KA’s.
Thus, up to an additive constant, there is a smallest KA. Of course, if KU
andKV are both smallest, up to an additive constant, thenKU = KV +O(1).
Whence the following definition.
Definition 4 (Kolmogorov complexity). Kolmogorov complexity K :
{0, 1}∗ → N is any fixed such smallest (p to an additive constant) function
KU .
Let’s sum up. The invariance theorem means that, up to an additive
constant, there is an intrinsic notion of Kolmogorov complexity and we can
speak of the Kolmogorov complexity of a binary string.
Q: Which is an integer defined up to a constant. . . Somewhat funny.
A: You witty! Statements that only make sense in the limit occur every-
where in mathematical contexts.
Q: Do not mind, I was joking.
A: In fact, Kolmogorov argued as follows about the constant, [23] p. 6:
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Of course, one can avoid the indeterminacies associated with
the [above] constants, by considering particular [. . . functions U ],
but it is doubtful that this can be done without explicit arbitrari-
ness. One must, however, suppose that the different “reasonable”
[above universal functions] will lead to “complexity estimates”
that will converge on hundreds of bits instead of tens of thou-
sands. Hence, such quantities as the “complexity” of the text
of “War and Peace” can be assumed to be defined with what
amounts to uniqueness.
Q: Using the interpretation you mentioned a minute ago with program-
ming languages concerning the enumeration theorem, the constant in the
invariance theorem can be viewed as the length of a LISP program which
interprets A.
A: You are right.
2.2 Coding pairs of strings
A: Have you noted the trick to encode an integer e and a string p into a
string 0e1p ?
Q: Yes, and the constant is the length of the extra part 0e1. But you have
encoded e in unary. Why not use binary representation and thus lower the
constant?
A: There is a problem. It is not trivial to encode two binary strings u, v
as a binary string w. We need a trick. But first, let’s be clear: encode here
means to apply a computable injective function {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗.
Observe that concatenation does not work: if w = uv then we don’t know
which prefix of w is u. A new symbol 2 inserted as a marker allows for an
encoding: from w = u2v we can indeed recover u, v. However, w is no more
a binary string.
A simple solution uses this last idea together with a padding function ap-
plied to u which allows 1 to become an end-marker. Let pad(u) be ob-
tained by inserting a new zero in front of every symbol in u. For instance,
pad(01011) = 0001000101. Now, a simple encoding w of strings u, v is the
concatenation w = pad(u)1v. In fact, the very definition of pad insures that
the end of the prefix pad(u) in w is marked by the first occurrence of 1 at
an odd position (obvious convention: first symbol has position 1). Thus,
from w we get pad(u) — hence u — and v in a very simple way: a finite
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automaton can do the job! Observe that
|pad(u)1v| = 2|u|+ |v|+ 1 (1)
Q: Is the constant 2 the best one can do?
A: No, one can iterate the trick. Instead of padding u, one can pad the
string |u| which is the binary representation of the length of u. Look at the
string w = pad(|u|)1uv. The first occurrence of 1 at an odd position tells
you which prefix of w is pad(|u|) and which suffix is uv. From the prefix
pad(|u|), you get |u|, hence |u|. From |u| and the suffix uv, you get u and v.
Nice trick, isn’t it? And since ||u|| = 1 + ⌊log(|u|)⌋, we get
|pad(|u|)1uv| = |u|+ |v|+ 2⌊log(|u|)⌋ + 3 (2)
Q: Exciting! One could altogether pad the length of the length.
A: Sure. pad(||u||)1|u|uv is indeed an encoding of u, v. The first occurrence
of 1 at an odd position tells you which prefix of w is pad(||u||) and which
suffix is |u|uv. From the prefix pad(||u||) , you get ||u|| hence ||u||. Now,
from ||u|| and the suffix |u|uv you get |u| — hence |u| — and uv. From |u|
and uv, you get u and v. Also, a simple computation leads to
|pad(||u||)1|u|uv| = |u|+ |v|+ ⌊log(|u|)⌋ + 2⌊log(1 + ⌊log(|u|)⌋)⌋ + 3 (3)
Q: Of course, we can iterate this process.
A: Right. But, let’s leave such refinements.
2.3 Non determinism
Q: Our problematic is about randomness. Chance, randomness, arbitrari-
ness, unreasonned choice, non determinism . . .Why not add randomness to
programs by making them non deterministic with several possible outputs?
A: Caution: if a single program can output every string then Kolmogorov
complexity collapses. In order to get a non trivial theory, you need to restrict
non determinism. There is a lot of reasonable ways to do so. It happens
that all lead to something which is essentially usual Kolmogorov complexity
up to some change of scale ([41], [18]). Same with the prefix Kolmogorov
complexity which we shall discuss later.
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3 How complex is Kolmogorov complexity?
Q: Well, let me tell you some points I see about KA.
The domain of KA appears to be the range of A. So that KA is total in case
A is onto.
Since there are finitely many programs p with length ≤ n, there can be only
finitely many x’s such that KA(x) ≤ n. So that, lim|x|→+∞KA(x) = +∞.
Also, in the definition of KA(x), there are 2 points:
1) find some program which outputs x,
2) make sure that all programs with shorter length either do not halt or
have output different from x.
Point 2 does not match with definitions of partial computable functions!
3.1 Approximation from above
A: Right. In general, KA is not partial computable.
Q: So, no way to compute KA.
A: Definitely not, in general. However, KA can be approximated from
above:
Proposition 5. KA is the limit of a computable decreasing sequence of
functions.
Moreover, we can take such a sequence of functions with finite domains.
To see this, fix an algorithm A for A and denote At the partial function
obtained by applying up to t steps of algorithm A for the sole programs
with length ≤ t. It is clear that (t, p) 7→ At(p) has computable graph. Also,
KAt(x) = min{|p| : p ∈ {0, 1}≤t and At(p) = x}
so that (t, x) 7→ KAt(x) has computable graph too.
To conclude, just observe that (t, x) 7→ KAt(x) is decreasing in t (with the
obvious convention that undefined = +∞) and thatKA(x) = limt→∞KAt(x).
The same is true for conditional Kolmogorov complexity KB( | ).
Q: If KA is not computable, there should be no computable modulus of
convergence for this approximation sequence. So what can it be good for?
A: In general, if a function f : {0, 1}∗ → N can be approximated from above
by a computable sequence of functions (ft)t∈N then X
f
n = {x : f(x) ≤ n} is
computably enumerable (in fact, both properties are equivalent). Which is
a very useful property of f . Indeed, such arguments are used in the proof
of some hard theorems in the subject of Kolmogorov complexity.
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Q: Could you give me the flavor of what it can be useful for?
A: Suppose you know thatXfn is finite (which is indeed the case for f = KA)
and has exactly m elements then you can explicitly get Xfn .
Q: Explicitly get a finite set? what do you mean?
A: What we mean is that there is a computable function which associates
to any m,n a code (in whatever modelization of computability) for a partial
computable function which has range Xfn in case m is equal to the number
of elements in Xfn . This is not trivial. We do this thanks to the ft’s.
Indeed, compute the ft(x)’s for all t’s and all x’s until you get m different
strings x1, . . . , xm such that ft1(x1), . . . , ftm(xm) are defined and ≤ n for
some t1, . . . , tm.
That you will get such x1, . . . , xm is insured by the fact that X
f
n has at least
m elements and that f(x) = min{ft(x) : t} for all x.
Since f ≤ ft, surely these xi’s are in Xfn . Moreover, they indeed constitute
the whole of Xfn since X
f
n has exactly m elements.
3.2 Dovetailing
Q: You run infinitely many computations, some of which never halt. How
do you manage them?
A: This is called dovetailing. You organize these computations (which are
infinitely many, some lasting forever) as follows:
— Do up to 1 computation step of ft(x) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ |x| ≤ 1,
— Do up to 2 computation steps of ft(x) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ |x| ≤ 2,
— Do up to 3 computation steps of ft(x) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ |x| ≤ 3,
. . .
Q: Somehow looks like Cantor’s enumeration of N2 as the sequence
(0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 2) (1, 1) (2, 0) (0, 3) (1, 2) (2, 1) (3, 0) . . .
A: This is really the same idea. Here, it would rather be an enumeration a`
la Cantor of N3. When dealing with a multi-indexed family of computations
(ϕt(~x))~t , you can imagine computation steps as tuples of integers (i,~t, ~x)
where i denotes the rank of some computation step of f~t(~x) (here, these
tuples are triples). Dovetailing is just a way of enumerating all points in a
discrete multidimensional space Nk via some zigzagging a` la Cantor.
Q: Well, Cantor wandering along a broken line which fills the discrete plane
here becomes a way to sequentialize parallel computations.
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3.3 Undecidability
Q: Let’s go back to KA. If A is onto then KA is total. So that if A is
also computable then KA should be computable too. In fact, to get KA(x)
just compute all A(p)’s, for increasing |p|’s until some has value x: this will
happen since A is onto.
You said KA is in general undecidable. Is this undecidability related to the
fact that A be partial computable and not computable?
A: No. It’s possible that KA be quite trivial with A as complex as you want.
Let f : {0, 1}∗ → N be any partial computable function. Set A(0x) = x and
A(11+f(x)0x) = x. Then, A is as complex as f though KA is trivial since
KA(x) = |x|+ 1, as is easy to check.
Q: Is it hard to prove that some KA is indeed not computable?
A: Not that much. If U : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is optimal then we can show
that KU is not computable. Thus, K (which is KU for some fixed optimal
U) is not computable.
And this is where Berry’s paradox comes back. Consider the length-lexicographic
order on binary strings: u <hier v if and only if |u| < |v| or |u| = |v| and u
is lexicographically before v.
Now, look, we come to the core of the argument. The key idea is to
introduce the function T : N → {0, 1}∗ defined as follows:
T (i) = the <hier smallest x such that KU (x) > i
As you see, this function is nothing but an implementation of the very
statement in Berry’s paradox modified according to Kolmogorov’s move from
definability to computability via the function A. Clearly, we have
KU (T (i)) > i (4)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that KU is computable. Then so is T and
so is the function V : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that V (p) = T (V al2(1p)) where
V al2(1p) is the integer with binary representation 1p.
Now, if i > 0 has binary representation 1p then T (i) = V (p), so that
KV (T (i)) ≤ |p| = ⌊log(i)⌋ (5)
The invariance theorem insures that, for some c, we have
KU ≤ KV + c (6)
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From inequalities (4), (5), (6) we get
i < KU (T (i)) ≤ KV (T (i)) + c ≤ log(i) + c
which is a contradiction for i large enough since limi→+∞
log(i)
i
= 0.
Thus, our assumption that KU be computable is false.
3.4 No non trivial computable lower bound
Q: Quite nice an argument.
A: Can get much more out of it:
Theorem 6. 1) No restriction of KU to an infinite computable set is com-
putable.
2) Worse, if X ⊆ {0, 1}∗ is computable and f : X → N is a computable
function and f(x) ≤ KU (x) for all x ∈ X then f is bounded!
To prove this, just change the above definition of T : N → {0, 1}∗ as follows:
T (i) = the <hier smallest x ∈ X such that f(x) > i
Clearly, by definition, we have f(T (i)) > i. Since T (i) ∈ X and f(x) ≤
KU (x) for x ∈ X, this implies equation (4) above. Also, f being computable,
so are T and V , and equation (5) still holds. As above, we conclude to a
contradiction.
Let’s reformulate this result in terms of the greatest monotonous (with re-
spect to ≤hier) lower bound of KU which is
m(x) = miny≥hierxKU (y)
This functionm is monotonous and tends to +∞ but it does so incredibly
slowly: on any computable set it can not grow as fast as any unbounded
computable function.
3.5 Kolmogorov complexity and representation of objects
Q: You have considered integers and their base 2 representations. Complex-
ity of algorithms is often much dependent on the way objects are represented.
Here, you have not be very precise about representation of integers.
A: There is a simple fact.
Proposition 7. Let f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be partial computable.
1) K(f(x)) ≤ K(x) +O(1) for every x in the domain of f .
2) If f is also injective then K(f(x)) = K(x) +O(1) for x ∈ domain(f).
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Indeed, denote U some fixed universal function such that K = KU .
To get a program which outputs f(x), we just encode a program π computing
f together with a program p outputting x.
Formally, let A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be such that A(pad(π)1z) is the output
of π on input U(z) for all z ∈ {0, 1}∗. Clearly, A(pad(π)1p) = f(x) so
that KA(f(x)) ≤ 2|π| + |p| + 1. Taking p such that K(x) = |p|, we get
KA(f(x)) ≤ K(x) + 2|π|+ 1.
The Invariance Theorem insures that K(f(x)) ≤ KA(f(x)) +O(1), whence
point 1 of the Proposition.
In case f is injective, it has a partial computable inverse g with domain the
range of f . Applying point 1 to f and g we get point 2.
A: So all representations of integers lead to the same Kolmogorov complex-
ity, up to a constant.
A: Yes, as long as one can computably go from one representation to the
other one.
4 Algorithmic Information Theory
4.1 Zip/Unzip
Q: A moment ago, you said the subject was also named Algorithmic Infor-
mation Theory. Why?
A: Well, you can look at K(x) as a measure of the information contents
that x conveys. The notion can also be vividly described using our everyday
use of compression/decompression software (cf. Alexander Shen’s lecture
[40]). First, notice the following simple fact:
Proposition 8. K(x) ≤ |x|+O(1)
Indeed, let A(x) = x. Then KA(x) = |x| and the above inequality is a mere
application of the Invariance Theorem.
Looking at the string x as a file, any program p such that U(p) = x can
be seen as a compressed file for x (especially in case the right member in
Proposition 8) is indeed < |x|. . . ).
So, U appears as a decompression algorithm which maps the compressed
file p onto the original file x. In this way, K(x) measures the length of the
shortest compressed files for x.
What does compression? It eliminates redundancies, explicits regularities
to shorten the file. Thus, maximum compression reduces the file to the core
of its information contents which is therefore measured by K(x).
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4.2 Some relations in Algorithmic Information Theory
Q: OK. And what does Algorithmic Information Theory look like?
Q: Conditional complexity should give some nice relations as is the case
with conditional probability.
A: Yes, there are relations which have some probability theory flavor. How-
ever, there are often logarithmic extra terms which come from the encoding
of pairs of strings. For instance, an easy relation:
K(x) ≤ K(x | y) +K(y) + 2 log(min(K(x | y),K(y))) +O(1) (7)
The idea to get this relation is as follows. Suppose you have a program p
(with no parameter) which outputs y and a program q (with one parameter)
which on input y outputs x, then you can mix them to get a (no parameter)
program which outputs x.
Formally, Suppose that p, q are optimal, i.e. K(y) = |p| and K(x | y) = |q|.
Let A1, A2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be such that
A1(pad(|z|)1zw) = A2(pad(|w|)1zw) = V (w,U(z))
where V denotes some fixed universal function such that K( | ) = KV ( | ).
It is clear that A1(pad(|p|)1pq) = A2(pad(|q|)1pq) = x, so that
KA1(x) ≤ |p|+ |q|+ 2 log(|p|) +O(1)
KA2(x) ≤ |p|+ |q|+ 2 log(|q|) +O(1)
whence, p, q being optimal programs,
KA1(x) ≤ K(y) +K(x | y) + 2 log(K(y)) +O(1)
KA2(x) ≤ K(y) +K(x | y) + 2 log(K(x | y)) +O(1)
Applying the Invariance Theorem, we get (7).
4.3 Kolmogorov complexity of pairs
Q: What about pairs of strings in the vein of the probability of a pair of
events?
A: First, we have to define the Kolmogorov complexity of pairs of strings.
The key fact is as follows:
Proposition 9. If f, g : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ are encodings of pairs of
strings (i.e. computable injections), then K(f(x, y)) = K(g(x, y)) +O(1).
As we always argue up to an additive constant, this leads to:
Definition 10. The Kolmogorov complexity of pairs isK(x, y) = K(f(x, y))
where f is any fixed encoding.
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To prove Proposition 9, observe that f ◦g−1 is a partial computable injection
such that f = (f ◦g−1)◦g. Then, apply Proposition 7 with argument g(x, y)
and function f ◦ g−1.
4.4 Symmetry of information
A: Relation (7) can be easily improved to
K(x, y) ≤ K(x | y) +K(y) + 2 log(min(K(x | y),K(y))) +O(1) (8)
The same proof works. Just observe that from both programs pad(|p|)1pq
and pad(|q|)1pq one gets q hence also y.
Now, (8) can be considerably improved:
Theorem 11. |K(x, y)−K(x | y)−K(y)| = O(log(K(x, y))
This is a hard result, independently obtained by Kolmogorov and Levin
around 1967 ([24], [50] p.117). We better skip the proof (you can get it in
[40] p. 6–7 or [30] Thm 2.8.2 p. 182–183).
Q: I don’t really see the meaning of that theorem.
A: Let’s restate it in another form.
Definition 12. I(x : y) = K(y) −K(y | x) is called the algorithmic infor-
mation about y contained in x.
This notion is quite intuitive: you take the difference between the whole
information contents of y and that when x is known for free.
Contrarily to what was expected in analogy with Shannon’s classical infor-
mation theory, this is not a symmetric function However, up to a logarithmic
term, it is symmetric:
Corollary 13. |I(x : y)− I(y : x)| = O(log(K(x, y))
For a proof, just apply Theorem 11 with K(x, y) and K(y, x) and observe
that K(x, y) = K(y, x) +O(1) (use Proposition 9).
5 Kolmogorov complexity and Logic
5.1 What to do with paradoxes
Q: Somehow, Solomonoff, Kolmogorov and Chaitin have built up a theory
from a paradox.
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A: Right. In fact, there seems to be two mathematical ways towards para-
doxes. The most natural one is to get rid of them by building secured and
delimited mathematical frameworks which will leave them all out (at least,
we hope so. . . ). Historically, this was the way followed in all sciences. A sec-
ond way, which came up in the 20th century, somehow integrates paradoxes
into scientific theories via some clever and sound (!) use of the ideas they
convey. Kolmogorov complexity is such a remarkable integration of Berry’s
paradox into mathematics.
Q: As Go¨del did with the liar paradox which is underlying his incomplete-
ness theorems. Can we compare these paradoxes?
A: Hard question. The liar paradox is about truth while Berry’s is about
definability. Viewed in computational terms, truth and definability somehow
correspond to denotational and operational semantics.
This leads to expect connections between incompleteness theorems a` la
Go¨del and Kolmogorov investigations.
5.2 Chaitin Incompleteness results
Q: So, incompleteness theorems can be obtained from Kolmogorov theory?
A: Yes. Gregory Chaitin, 1971 [7], pointed and popularized a simple but
clever and spectacular application of Kolmogorov complexity (this original
paper by Chaitin did not consider K but the number of states of Turing
machines, which is much similar).
Let T be a computable theory containing Peano arithmetic such that all
axioms of T are true statements.
Theorem 14. There exists a constant c such that if T proves K(x) ≥ n
then n ≤ c.
The proof is by way of contradiction and is a redo of the undecidability of
KU
PASCALbin
. Suppose that T can prove statements K(x) ≥ n for arbitrarily
large n’s. Consider a computable enumeration of all theorems of T and let
f : N → N be such that f(n) is the first string x such that K(x) ≥ n
appears as a theorem of T . Our hypothesis insures that f is total, hence a
computable function. By very definition,
K(f(n) ≥ n (9)
Also, applying Propositions 7 and 8 we get
K(f(n)) ≤ K(n) +O(1) ≤ log(n) +O(1) (10)
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whence n ≤ log(n) +O(1), which is a contradiction if n is large enough.
Q: Quite nice. But this does not give any explicit statement. How to
compute the constant c ? How to get any explicit x’s such that K(x) > c ?
A: Right. Hum. . . you could also see this as a particularly strong form of
incompleteness: you have a very simple infinite family of statements, only
finitely many can be proved but you don’t know which ones.
5.3 Logical complexity of K
A: By the way, there is a point we should mention as concerns the logical
complexity of Kolmogorov complexity.
Since K is total and not computable, its graph can not be computably
enumerable (c.e.). However, the graph of anyKA (hence that ofK) is always
of the form R ∩ S where R is c.e. and S is co-c.e. (i.e. the complement of
an c.e. relation).
We can see this as follows. Fix an algorithm P for A and denote At the
partial function obtained by applying up to t computation steps of this
algorithm. Then
KA(x) ≤ n⇔ ∃t (∃p ∈ {0, 1}≤n At(p) = x)
The relation within parentheses is computable in t, n, x, so that KA(x) ≤ n
is c.e. in n, x.
Replacing n by n − 1 and going to negations, we see that KA(x) ≥ n is
co-c.e. Since KA(x) = n ⇔ (KA(x) ≤ n) ∧ (KA(x) ≥ n), we conclude that
KA(x) = n is the intersection of an c.e. and a co-c.e relations.
In terms of Post’s hierarchy, the graph of KA is Σ
0
1 ∧ Π01, hence ∆02. The
same with KB( | ).
Q: Would you remind me about Post’s hierarchy?
A: Emil Post introduced families of relations R(x1 . . . xm) on strings and/or
integers. Let’s look at the first two levels:
Σ01 and Π
0
1 are the respective families of c.e. and co-c.e. relations,
Σ02 is the family of projections of Π
0
1 relations,
Π02 consist of complements of Σ
0
2 relations.
Notations Σ0i and Π
0
i come from the following logical characterizations:
R(~x) is Σ01 if R(~x)⇔ ∃t1 . . . ∃tk T (~t, ~x) with T computable.
R(~x) is Σ02 if R(~x)⇔ ∃~t ∀~u T (~t, ~u, ~x) with T computable.
Π01 and Π
0
2 are defined similarly with quantifications ∀ and ∀∃.
Each of these families is closed under union and intersection. But not under
complementation since Σ0i and Π
0
i are so exchanged.
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A last notation: ∆0i denotes Σ
0
i ∩ Π0i . In particular, ∆01 means c.e. and
co-c.e. hence computable.
As for inclusion, ∆02 strictly contains the boolean closure of Σ
0
1, in particular
it contains Σ01 ∪Π01. This is why the term hierarchy is used.
Also, we see that KA is quite low as a ∆
0
2 relation since Σ
0
1 ∧ Π01 is the
very first level of the boolean closure of Σ01.
6 Random finite strings and their applications
6.1 Random versus how much random
Q: Let’s go back to the question: “what is a random string?”
A: This is the interesting question, but this will not be the one we shall
answer. We shall modestly consider the question: “To what extent is x
random?”
We know that K(x) ≤ |x| + O(1). It is tempting to declare a string x
random if K(x) ≥ |x| − O(1). But what does it really mean? The O(1)
hides a constant. Let’s explicit it.
Definition 15. A string is called c-incompressible (where c ≥ 0 is any
constant) if K(x) ≥ |x| − c. Other strings are called c-compressible.
0-incompressible strings are also called incompressible.
Q: Are there many c-incompressible strings?
A: Kolmogorov noticed that they are quite numerous.
Theorem 16. For each n the proportion of c-incompressible among strings
with length n is > 1− 2−c.
For instance, if c = 4 then, for any length n, more than 90% of strings are
4-incompressible. With c = 7 and c = 10 we go to more than 99% and
99.9%.
The proof is a simple counting argument. There are 1+2+22+· · ·+2n−c−1 =
2n−c − 1 programs with length < n − c. Every string with length n which
is c-compressible is necessarily the output of such a program (but some of
these programs may not halt or may output a string with length 6= n). Thus,
there are at most 2n−c − 1 c-compressible strings with length n, hence at
least 2n− (2n−c− 1) = 2n− 2n−c+1 c-incompressible strings with length n.
Whence the proportion stated in the theorem.
22
Q: Are c-incompressible strings really random?
A: Yes. Martin-Lo¨f, 1965 [34], formalized the notion of statistical test and
proved that incompressible strings pass all these tests (cf. §8.3).
6.2 Applications of random finite strings in computer science
Q: And what is the use of incompressible strings in computer science?
A: Roughly speaking, incompressible strings are strings without any form
of local or global regularity. Consideration of such objects may help almost
anytime one has to show something is complex, for instance a lower bound
for worst or average case time/space complexity. The accompanying key
tool is Proposition 7.
And, indeed, incompressible strings have been successfully used in such con-
texts. An impressive compilation of such applications can be found in Ming
Li and Paul Vitanyi’s book ([30], chapter 6), running through nearly 100
pages!
Q: Could you give an example?
A: Sure. The very first such application is quite representative. It is due to
Wolfgang Paul, 1979 [37] and gives a quadratic lower bound on the computa-
tion time of any one-tape Turing machineM which recognizes palindromes.
Up to a linear waste of time, one can suppose that M always halts on its
first cell.
Let n be even and xxR = x1x2 . . . xn−1xnxnxn−1 . . . x2x1 be a palindrome
written on the input tape of the Turing machine M.
For each i < n let CSi be the crossing sequence associated to cell i, i.e. the
list of successive states of M when its head visits cell i.
Key fact: string x1x2 . . . xi is uniquely determined by CSi.
I.e. x1x2 . . . xi is the sole string y such that — relative to anM-computation
on some palindrome with prefix y —, the crossing sequence on cell |y| is CSi.
This can be seen as follows. Suppose y 6= x1x2 . . . xi leads to the same
crossing sequence CSi on cell |y| for anM-computation on some palindrome
yzzRyR. Run M on input yxi+1 . . . xnxR. Consider the behaviour of M
while the head is on the left part y. This behaviour is exactly the same as
that for the run on input yzzRyR because the sole useful information forM
while scanning y comes from the crossing sequence at cell |y|. In particular,
M – which halts on cell 1 — accepts this input yxi+1 . . . xnxR. But this is
not a palindrome! Contradiction.
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Observe that the way x1x2 . . . xi is uniquely determined by CSi is quite
complex. But we don’t care about that. It will just charge the O(1) constant
in (11).
Using Proposition 7 with the binary string associated to CSi which is c
times longer (where c = ⌈|Q|⌉, |Q| being the number of states), we see that
K(x1x2 . . . xi) ≤ c|Ti|+O(1) (11)
If i ≥ n2 then x1x2 . . . xn2 is uniquely determined by the pair (x1x2 . . . xi,
n
2 ).
Hence also by the pair (CSi,
n
2 ). Since the binary representation of
n
2 uses
≤ log(n) bits, this pair can be encoded with 2c|CSi|+log(n)+1 bits. Thus,
K(x1x2 . . . xn
2
) ≤ 2c|CSi|+ log(n) +O(1) (12)
Now, let’s sum equations (12) for i = n2 , . . . , n. Observe that the sum of the
lengthes of the crossing sequences CSn
2
, . . . , CSn is at most the number T
of computation steps. Therefore, this summation leads to
n
2
K(x1x2 . . . xn
2
) ≤ 2cT + n
2
log(n) +O(
n
2
) (13)
Now, consider as x a string such that x1x2 . . . xn
2
is incompressible, i.e.
K(x1x2 . . . xn
2
) ≥ n2 . Equation (13) leads to
(
n
2
)2 ≤ 2cT + n
2
log(n) +O(
n
2
) (14)
whence T ≥ O(n2). Since the input xxR has length 2n, this proves the
quadratic lower bound. QED
7 Prefix complexity
7.1 Self delimiting programs
Q: I heard about prefix complexity. What is it?
A: Prefix complexity is a very interesting variant of Kolmogorov complexity
which was introduced around 1973 by Levin [28] and, independently, by
Chaitin [8].
The basic idea is taken from some programming languageswhich have an
explicit delimiter to mark the end of a program. For instance, PASCAL
uses “end.”. Thus, no program can be a proper prefix of another program.
Q: This is not true with PROLOG programs: you can always add a new
clause.
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A: To execute a PROLOG program, you have to write down a query. And
the end of a query is marked by a full stop. So, it’s also true for PROLOG.
Q: OK. However, it’s not true for C programs nor LISP programs.
A: Hum. . . You are right.
7.2 Chaitin-Levin prefix complexity
A: Let’s say that a set X of strings is prefix-free if no string in X is a proper
prefix of another string inX. A programming language A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗
is prefix if its domain is a prefix-free set.
Q: So the programming language PASCAL that you seem to be fond of is
prefix.
A: Sure, PASCAL is prefix.
A: But, what’s new with this special condition?
A: Kolmogorov Invariance Theorem from §2.1 goes through with prefix
programming languages, leading to the prefix variant H of K.
Theorem 17 (Invariance theorem). There exists a prefix partial com-
putable function Uprefix : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. such that KUprefix ≤ KA+O(1)
for any prefix partial computable function A : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. In other
words, up to an additive constant, KUprefix is the smallest one among the
KA’s.
Definition 18 (Prefix Kolmogorov complexity). Prefix Kolmogorov
complexity H : {0, 1}∗ → N is any fixed such function KUprefix .
7.3 Comparing K and H
Q: How does H compare to K ?
A: A simple relation is as follows:
Proposition 19. K(x)−O(1) ≤ H(x) ≤ K(x) + 2 log(K(x)) +O(1)
Idem with K( | ) and H( | ).
The first inequality is a mere application of the Invariance Theorem for
K (since Uprefix is a programming language). To get the second one, we con-
sider a programming language U such that K = KU and construct a prefix
programming language U ′ as follows: the domain of U ′ is the set of strings
of the form pad(|p|)1p and U ′(pad(|p|)1p) = U(p). By very construction,
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the domain of U ′ is prefix-free. Also, KU ′(x) = KU (x) + 2 log(KU (x)) + 1.
An application of the Invariance Theorem for H gives the second inequality
of the Proposition.
This inequality can be improved. A better encoding leads to
H(x) ≤ K(x) + log(K(x)) + 2 log log(K(x)) +O(1)
Sharper relations have been proved by Solovay, 1975 (unpublished [43], cf.
also [30] p. 211):
Proposition 20. H(x) = K(x) +K(K(x)) +O(K(K(K(x))))
K(x) = H(x)−H(H(x)) −O(H(H(H(x))))
7.4 How big is H ?
Q: How big is H ?
A: K and H behave in similar ways. Nevertheless, there are some differ-
ences. Essentially a logarithmic term.
Proposition 21. H(x) ≤ |x|+ 2 log(|x|) +O(1)
To prove it, apply the H Invariance Theorem to the prefix function
A(pad(|x|)1x) = x.
Of course, it can be improved to
H(x) ≤ |x|+ log(|x|) + 2 log log(|x|) +O(1)
Q: How big can be H(x)− |x| ?
A: Well, to get a non trivial question, we have to fix the length of the x’s.
The answer is not a simple function of |x| as expected, it does use H itself:
max|x|=n(H(x)− |x|) = H(|x|) +O(1)
Q: How big can be H(x)−K(x) ?
A: It can be quite large:
K(x) ≤ |x| − log(|x|) ≤ |x| ≤ H(x)
happens for arbitrarily large x’s ([30] Lemma 3.5.1 p. 208).
7.5 Convergence of series and the Coding Theorem
Q: What’s so really special with this prefix condition?
A: The possibility to use Kraft’s inequality. This inequality tells you that
if Z is a prefix-free set of strings then Σp∈Z2
−|p| ≤ 1.
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Kraft’s inequality is not hard to prove. Denote Iu the set of infinite strings
which admit u as prefix. Observe that
1) 2−|p| is the probability of Iu.
2) If u, v are prefix incomparable then Iu and Iv are disjoint.
3) Since Z is prefix, the Iu’s, u ∈ Z are pairwise disjoint and their union
has probability Σp∈Z2
−|p| < 1
The KA(x)’s are lengthes of distinct programs in a prefix set (namely, the
domain of A). So, Kraft’s inequality implies
Σx∈{0,1}∗2
−KA(x) < 1.
In fact, H satisfies the following very important property, proved by Levin
[29] (which can be seen as another version of the Invariance Theorem for
H):
Theorem 22 (Coding Theorem). Up to a multiplicative factor, 2−H is
maximum among functions F : {0, 1}∗ → R such that Σx∈{0,1}∗F (x) < +∞
and which are approximable from below (in a sense dual to that in §3.1, i.e.
the set of pairs (x, q) such that q is rational and q < F (x) is c.e.).
8 Random infinite sequences
8.1 Top-down approach to randomness of infinite sequences
Q: So, we now come to random infinite sequences.
A: It happens that there are two equivalent ways to get a mathematical
notion of random sequences. We shall first consider the most natural one,
which is a sort of “top-down approach”.
Probability laws tell you that with probability one such and such things
happen, i.e. that some particular set of sequences has probability one. A
natural approach leads to consider as random those sequences which satisfy
all such laws, i.e. belong to the associated sets (which have probability one).
An easy way to realize this would be to declare a sequence to be random
just in case it belongs to all sets (of sequences) having probability one or,
equivalently, to no set having probability zero. Said otherwise, the family
of random sequences would be the intersection of all sets having probability
one, i.e. the complement of the union of all sets having probability zero.
Unfortunately, this family is empty! In fact, let r be any sequence: the
singleton set {r} has probability zero and contains r.
In order to maintain the idea, we have to consider a not too big family
of sets with probability one.
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Q: A countable family.
A: Right. The intersection of a countable family of set with probability
one will have probability one. So that the set of random sequences will have
probability one, which is a much expected property.
8.2 Frequency tests and von Mises random sequences
A: This top-down approach was pionneered by Richard von Mises in 1919
([48], [49]) who insisted on frequency statistical tests. He declared an infinite
binary sequence a0a1a2 . . . to be random (he used the term Kollektiv) if the
frequence of 1’s is “everywhere” fairly distributed in the following sense:
i) Let Sn be the number of 1’s among the first n terms of the sequence.
Then limn→∞
Sn
n
= 12 .
ii) The same is true for every subsequence an0+1an1+1an2+1 . . . where n0, n1, n2 . . .
are the successive integers n such that φ(a0a1 . . . an) = 1 where φ is an “ad-
missible” place-selection rule.
What is an “admissible” place-selection rule was not definitely settled by
von Mises. Alonzo Church, 1940, proposed that admissibility be exactly
computability.
It is not difficult to prove that the family of infinite binary sequence
satisfying the above condition has probability one for any place-selection
rule. Taking the intersection over all computable place-selection rules, we
see that the family of von Mises-Church random sequences has probability
one.
However, von Mises-Church notion of random sequence is too large.
There are probability laws which do not reduce to tests with place-selection
rules and are not satisfied by all von Mises-Church random sequences. As
shown by Jean Ville, [47] 1939, this is the case for the law of iterated log-
arithm. This very important law (due to A. I. Khintchin, 1924) expresses
that with probabililty one
lim sup
n→+∞
S∗n√
2 log log(n)
= 1 and lim inf
n→+∞
S∗n√
2 log log(n)
= −1
where S∗n =
Sn−
n
2√
n
4
(cf. William Feller’s book [14], p. 186, 204–205).
Q: Wow! What do these equations mean?
A: They are quite meaningful. The quantities n2 and
√
n
4 are the expec-
tation and standard deviation of Sn. So that, S
∗
n is obtained from Sn by
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normalization: Sn and S
∗
n are linearly related as random variables, and S
∗
n’s
expectation and standard deviation are 0 and 1.
Let’s interpret the lim sup equation, the other one being similar (in fact, it
can be obtained from the first one by symmetry).
Remember that lim supn→+∞ fn is obtained as follows. Consider the se-
quence vn = supm≥n fm. The bigger is n the smaller is the set {m : m ≥ n }.
So that the sequence vn decreases, and lim supn→+∞ fn is its limit.
The law of iterated logarithm tells you that with probabililty one the set
{n : S∗n > λ
√
2 log log(n)} is finite in case λ > 1 and infinite in case λ < 1.
Q: OK.
A: More precisely, there are von Mises-Church random sequences which
satisfy Sn
n
≥ 12 for all n, a property which is easily seen to contradict the
law of iterated logarithm.
Q: So, von Mises’ approach is definitely over.
A: No. Kolmogorov, 1963 [22], and Loveland, 1966 [31], independently
considered an extension of the notion of place-selection rule.
Q: Kolmogorov once more. . .
A: Indeed. Kolmogorov allows place-selection rules giving subsequences
proceeding in some new order, i.e. mixed subsequences. The associated
notion of randomness is called Kolmogorov stochastic randomness (cf. [26]
1987). Since there are more conditions to satisfy, stochastic random se-
quences form a subclass of von Mises-Church random sequences. They con-
stitute, in fact, a proper subclass ([31]).
However, it is not known whether they satisfy all classical probability laws.
8.3 Martin-Lo¨f random sequences
Q: So, how to come to a successful theory of random sequences?
A: Martin-Lo¨f found such a theory.
Q: That was not Kolmogorov? The same Martin-Lo¨f you mentioned con-
cerning random finite strings?
A: Yes, the same Martin-Lo¨f, in the very same paper [34] in 1965. Kol-
mogorov looked for such a notion, but it was Martin-Lo¨f, a Swedish mathe-
matician, who came to the pertinent idea. At that time, he was a pupil of
Kolmogorov and studied in Moscow. Martin-Lo¨f made no use of Kolmogorov
random finite string to get the right notion of infinite random sequence.
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What he did is to forget about the frequency character of computable sta-
tistical tests (in von Mises-Church notion of randomness) and look for what
could be the essence of general statistical tests and probability laws. Which
he did both for finite strings and for infinite sequences.
Q: Though intuitive, this concept is rather vague!
A: Indeed. And Martin-Lo¨f’s analysis of what can be a probability law is
quite interesting.
To prove a probability law amounts to prove that a certain set X of se-
quences has probability one. To do this, one has to prove that the exception
set — which is the complement Y = {0, 1}N \ X— has probability zero.
Now, in order to prove that Y ⊆ {0, 1}N has probability zero, basic measure
theory tells us that one has to include Y in open sets with arbitrarily small
probability. I.e. for each n ∈ N one must find an open set Un ⊇ Y which
has probability ≤ 12n .
If things were on the real line R we would say that Un is a countable
union of intervals with rational endpoints.
Here, in {0, 1}N, Un is a countable union of sets of the form Iu = u{0, 1}N
where u is a finite binary string and Iu is the set of infinite sequences which
extend u. Well, in order to prove that Y has probability zero, for each
n ∈ N one must find a family (un,m)m∈N such that Y ⊆
⋃
m Iun,m and
Proba(
⋃
m Iun,m) ≤ 12n for each n ∈ N.
And now Martin-Lo¨f makes a crucial observation: mathematical proba-
bility laws which we can consider necessarily have some effective character.
And this effectiveness should reflect in the proof as follows:
the doubly indexed sequence (un,m)n,m∈N is computable.
Thus, the set
⋃
m Iun,m is a computably enumerable open set and
⋂
n
⋃
m Iun,m
is a countable intersection of a computably enumerable family of open sets.
Q: This observation has been checked for proofs of usual probability laws?
A: Sure. Let it be the law of large numbers, that of iterated logarithm. . . In
fact, it’s quite convincing.
Q: This open set
⋃
m Iun,m could not be computable?
A: No. A computable set in {0, 1}N is always a finite union of Iu’s.
Q: Why?
A: What does it mean that Z ⊆ {0, 1}N is computable? That there is some
Turing machine such that, if you write an infinite sequence α on the input
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tape then after finitely many steps, the machine tells you if α is in Z or
not. When it does answer, the machine has read but a finite prefix u of α,
so that it gives the same answer if α is replaced by any β ∈ Iu. In fact,
an application of Ko¨nig’s lemma (which we shall not detail) shows that we
can bound the length of such a prefix u. Whence the fact that Z is a finite
union of Iu’s.
Q: OK. So, we shall take as random sequences those sequences which are
outside any set which is a countable intersection of a computably enumerable
family of open sets and has probability zero.
A: This would be too much. Remember, Proba(
⋃
m Iun,m) ≤ 12n . Thus, the
way the probability of
⋃
m Iun,m tends to 0 is computably controlled.
So, here is Martin-Lo¨f’s definition:
Definition 23. A set of infinite binary sequences is constructively of prob-
ability zero if it is included in
⋂
n
⋃
m Iun,m where (m,n) 7→ un,m is a partial
computable function N2 → {0, 1}∗ such that Proba(⋃m Iun,m) ≤ 12n for all
n.
And now comes a very surprising theorem (Martin-Lo¨f, [34], 1966):
Theorem 24. There is a largest set of sequences (for the inclusion ordering)
which is constructively of probability zero.
Q: Largest? up to what?
A: Up to nothing. Really largest set: it is constructively of probability zero
and contains any other set constructively of probability zero.
Q: How is it possible?
A: Via a diagonalization argument. The construction has some techni-
calities but we can sketch the ideas. From the well-known existence of
universal c.e. sets, we get a computable enumeration ((Oi,j)i)j of sequences
of c.e. open sets. A slight transformation allows to satisfy the inequality
Proba(Oi) ≤ 12i . Now, set Uj =
⋃
eOe,e+j+1 (here lies the diagonalization!)
Clearly, Proba(Oj) ≤
∑
e
1
2e+j+1
= 1
2j
, so that
⋂
j Uj is constructively of
probability zero. Also, Uj ⊇ Oi,j for all j ≥ i whence (
⋂
j Uj) ⊇ (
⋂
j Oi,j).
Q: So, Martin-Lo¨f random sequences are exactly those lying in this largest
set.
A: Yes. And all theorems in probability theory can be strengthened by
replacing “with probability one” by “for all Martin-Lo¨f random sequences”
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8.4 Bottom-up approach to randomness of infinite sequences:
Martin-Lo¨f’s Large oscillations theorem
Q: So, now, what is the bottom-up approach?
A: This approach looks at the asymptotic algorithmic complexity of the
prefixes of the infinite binary sequence a0a1a2 . . ., namely the K(a0 . . . an)’s.
The next theorem is the first significative result relevant to this approach.
Point 2 is due to Albert Meyer and Donald Loveland, 1969 [32] p. 525.
Points 3,4 are due to Gregory Chaitin, 1976 [9]. (Cf. also [30] 2.3.4 p.124).
Theorem 25. The following conditions are equivalent:
1) a0a1a2 . . . is computable
2) K(a0 . . . an | n) = O(1).
3) |K(a0 . . . an)−K(n)| ≤ O(1).
4) |K(a0 . . . an)− log(n)| ≤ O(1).
Q: Nice results. Let me tell what I see. We know that K(x) ≤ |x|+O(1).
Well, if we have the equality, K(a0 . . . an) = n − O(1), i.e. if maximum
complexity occurs for all prefixes, then the sequence a0a1a2 . . . should be
random! Is it indeed the case?
A: That’s a very tempting idea. And Kolmogorov had also looked for such
a characterization. Unfortunately, as Martin-Lo¨f proved around 1965 (1966,
[35]), there is no such sequence! It is a particular case of a more general
result (just set f(n)=constant).
Theorem 26 (Large oscillations, [35]). Let f : N → N be a computable
function such that Σn∈N2
−f(n) = +∞. Then, for every binary sequence
a0a1a2 . . . there are infinitely many n’s such that K(a0 . . . an | n) < n−f(n).
Q: So, the bottom-up approach completely fails as concerns a characteri-
zation of random sequences. Hum. . . But it does succeed as concerns com-
putable sequences, which were already fairly well characterized. Funny!
A: It’s however possible to sandwich the set of Martin-Lo¨f random sequences
between two sets of probability one defined in terms of the K complexity of
prefixes.
Theorem 27 ([35]). Let f : N → N be computable such that the series
Σ2−f(n) is computably convergent. Set
X = {a0a1 . . . : K(a0 . . . an | n) ≥ n−O(1) for infinitely many n’s.}
Yf = {a0a1 . . . : K(a0 . . . an | n) ≥ n− f(n) for all but finitely many n’s.}
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Denote ML the set of Martin-Lo¨f random sequences. Then X and Yf have
probability one and X ⊂ML ⊂ Yf .
NB: Proper inclusions have been proved by Peter Schnorr, 1971 [39] (see
also [30] 2.5.15 p.154).
Let’s illustrate this theorem on an easy and spectacular corollary which
uses the fact that 2−2 log(n) = 1
n2
and that the series Σ 1
n2
is computably con-
vergent: if K(a0 . . . an | n) ≥ n− c for infinitely many n’s then K(a0 . . . an |
n) ≥ n− 2 log(n) for all but finitely many n’s.
8.5 Bottom-up approach with prefix complexity
Q: What about considering prefix Kolmogorov complexity?
A: Kolmogorov’s original idea does work with prefix Kolmogorov complex-
ity. This has been proved by Claus Peter Schnorr (1974, unpublished, cf.
[8] Remark p. 106, and [10] p. 135-137 for a proof).
Robert M. Solovay, 1974 (unpublished [43]) strengthened Schnorr’s result
(cf. [10] p. 137-139).
Theorem 28. The following conditions are equivalent:
1) a0a1a2 . . . is Martin-Lo¨f ramdom random
2) H(a0 . . . an) ≥ n−O(1) for all n.
3) limn→+∞(H(a0 . . . an)− n) = +∞.
4) For any c.e. sequence (Ai)i of open subsets of {0, 1}N if ΣiProba(Ai) <
+∞ then a0a1a2 . . . belongs to finitely many Ai’s.
These equivalences stress the robustness of the notion of Martin-Lo¨f ramdom
sequence.
8.6 Top-down/Bottom-up approaches: a sum up
Q: I get somewhat confused with these two approaches. Could you sum up.
A: The top-down and bottom-up approaches both work and lead to the
very same class of random sequences.
Kolmogorov looked at the bottom-up approach from the very beginning in
1964. But nothing was possible with the original Kolmogorov complexity,
Levin-Chaitin’s variant H was needed.
Q: Ten years later. . .
A: As for the top-down approach, it was pionneered by von Mises since
1919 and made successful by Martin-Lo¨f in 1965. Martin-Lo¨f had to give
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up von Mises frequency tests. However, Kolmogorov was much interested
by these frequency tests ([22]), and he refined them in a very clever way
with the purpose to recover Martin-Lo¨f randomness, which lead him to the
notion of Kolmogorov stochastic randomness. Unfortunately, up to now, we
only know that
Martin-Lo¨f random ⇒ stochastic random ⇒ von Mises-Church random.
The second implication is known to be strict but not the first one. Would it
be an equivalence, this would give a quite vivid characterization of random
sequences via much concrete tests.
8.7 Randomness with other probability distributions
Q: All this is relative to the uniform probability distribution. Can it be
extended to arbitrary probability distributions?
A: Not arbitrary probability distributions, but computable Borel ones:
those distributions P such that the sequence of reals (P (Iu))u∈{0,1}∗ (where
Iu is the set of infinite sequences which extend u) is computable, i.e. there
is a computable function f : {0, 1}∗ × N → Q such that
|P (Iu)− f(u, n)| ≤ 12n .
Martin-Lo¨f’s definition of random sequences extends trivially. As for char-
acterizations with variants of Kolmogorov complexity, one has to replace the
length of a finite string u by the quantity −log(P (Iu)).
8.8 Chaitin’s real Ω
Q: I read a lot of things about Chaitin’s real Ω.
A: Gregory Chaitin, 1987 [11], explicited a spectacular random real and
made it very popular.
Consider a universal prefix partial recursive function U and let Ω be the
Lebesgue measure of the set
{α ∈ {0, 1}N | ∃n U(α↾n) is defined}
Q: Seems to be an avatar of the halting problem.
A: Indeed. It is the probability that, on an infinite input, the machine
which computes U halts in finite time (hence after reading a finite prefix of
its input).
Ω = Σ{2−|p| | U halts on input p} (15)
Theorem 29. The binary expansion of Ω is Martin-Lo¨f ramdom.
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Q: How does one prove that Ω is ramdom?
A: U has prefix-free domain, hence Ω = Σ{2−|p| | p ∈ domain(U)} < 1.
Any halting program with length n contributes for exactly 2−n to Ω. Thus,
if you know the first k digits of Ω then you know the number of halting
programs with length ≤ k. From this number, by dovetailing, you can get
the list of the halting programs with length ≤ k (cf. §3.1, 3.2). Having these
programs, you can get the first string u which is not the output of such a
program. Clearly, H(u) > k. Now, u is computably obtained from the
first k digits of Ω, so that by Proposition 7 we have H(u) ≤ H(ω0 . . . ωk) +
O(1). Whence H(ω0 . . . ωk) ≥ k + O(1), which is condition 2 of Theorem
28 (Schnorr condition). This proves that the binary expansion of Ω is a
Martin-Lo¨f ramdom sequence.
Q: Ω seems to depend on the universal machine.
A: Sure. We can speak of the class of Chaitin Ω reals: those reals which
express the halting probability of some universal prefix programming lan-
guage.
Cristian Calude & Peter Hertling & Bakhadyr Khoussainov & Yongge Wang,
1998 [4] (cf. also Anton`ın Kuc˘era & Theodore Slaman, 2000 [27]) proved
a very beautiful result: r is a Chaitin Ω real if and only if (the binary
development of) r is Martin-Lo¨f random and r computably enumerable from
below (i.e. the set of rational numbers < r is c.e.).
Q: I read that this real has incredible properties.
A: This real has a very simple and appealing definition. Moreover, as we
just noticed, there is a simple way to get all size n halting programs from
its n first digits. This leads to many consequences due to the following fact:
any Σ01 statement of the form ∃~xΦ(~x) (where Φ is a computable relation)
is equivalent to a statement insuring that a certain program halts, and this
program is about the same size as the statement. Now, deciding the truth
of Σ01 statements is the same as deciding that of Π
0
1 statements.
And significant Π01 statements abound! Like Fermat’s last theorem (which
is now Wiles’ theorem) or consistency statements. This is why Chaitin says
Ω is the “Wisdom real”.
Other properties of Ω are common to all reals which have Martin-Lo¨f
ramdom binary expansions. For instance, transcendance and the fact that
any theory can give us but finitely many digits.
Hum. . . About that last point, using Kleene’s recursion theorem, Robert
Solovay, 1999 [45], proved that there are particular Chaitin Ω reals about
which a given theory can not predict any single bit!
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8.9 Non computable invariance
Q: In some sense, Martin-Lo¨f ramdomness is a part of recursion theory. Do
random sequences form a Turing degree or a family of Turing degrees?
A: Oh, no! Randomness is definitely not computable invariant. It’s in fact
a very fragile notion: quite insignificant modifications destroy randomness.
This makes objects like Ω so special.
Let’s illustrate this point on an example. Suppose you transform a random
sequence a0a1a2a3 . . . into a00a10a20a30 . . . The sequence you obtain has
the same Turing degree as the original one, but it is no more random since
its digits with odd ranks are all 0. A random sequence has to be random
everywhere. Hum . . . for Martin-Lo¨f random reals, I should rather say ”every
c.e. where”.
Q: Everywhat?
A: ”Every c.e. where”. I mean that if f is a computable function from
N into N (in other words, a computable enumeration of an c.e. set) then
the sequence of digits with ranks f(0), f(1), f(2), . . . of a Martin-Lo¨f ran-
dom sequence has to be Martin-Lo¨f random. In fact, you recognize here an
extraction process a` la von Mises for which a random sequence should give
another random sequence.
Q: OK. What about many-one degrees?
A: Same. Let’s represent a binary infinite sequence α by the set Xα of
positions of digits 1 in α. Then,
n ∈ Xa0a1a2... ⇔ 2n ∈ Xa00a10a20...
Also, let ϕ(2n) = n and ϕ(2n+1) = k where k is some fixed rank such that
ak = 0, then
n ∈ Xa00a10a20ldots ⇔ ϕ(n) ∈ Xa0a1a2...
These two equivalences prove that Xa0a1a2... and Xa00a10a20... are many-one
equivalent.
9 More randomness
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Hamlet, William Shakespeare
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9.1 Beyond c.e.: oracles and infinite computations
Q: Are there other random reals than Chaitin Ω reals ?
A: Sure. Just replace in Martin-Lo¨f’s definition the computable enumer-
ability condition by a more complex one. For instance, you can consider
Σ02 sets, which amounts to computable enumerability with oracle ∅′ (the set
which encodes the halting problem for Turing machines).
Q: Wait, wait. Just a minute ago, you said that for all classical probability
laws, c.e. open sets, i.e. Σ01 sets, are the ones which come in when proving
that the exception set to the law has probability zero. So, what could be
the use of such generalizations?
A: Clearly, the more random sequences you have which satisfy classical
probability laws, the more you strengthen these theorems as we said earlier.
In this sense, it is better to stick to Martin-Lo¨f’s definition. But you can
also want to consider random sequences as worst objects to use in some con-
text. Depending on that context, you can be lead to ask for much complex
randomness conditions.
Also, you can have some very natural objects much alike Chaitin real Ω
which can be more complex.
Q: Be kind, give an example!
A: In a recent paper, 2001 [2], Vero´nica Becher & Chaitin & Sergio Daicz
consider the probability that a prefix universal programming language pro-
duces a finite output, though possibly running indefinitely. They prove that
this probability is an Ω′ Chaitin real, i.e. its binary expansion is ∅′-random.
Becher & Chaitin, 2002 [1], consider the probability for the output to rep-
resent a cofinite set of integers, relatively to some coding of sets of integers
by sequences. They prove it to be an Ω′′ Chaitin real.
Such reals are as much appealing and remarkable as Chaitin’s real Ω and
also they are logically more complex.
9.2 Far beyond: Solovay random reals in set theory
Q: I heard about Solovay random reals in set theory. Has it anything to do
with Martin-Lo¨f random reals?
A: Hum... These notions come from very different contexts. But well,
there is a relation: proper inclusion. Every Solovay random real is Martin-
Lo¨f random. The converse being far from true. In fact, these notions of
randomness are two extreme notions of randomness. Martin-Lo¨f randomness
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is the weakest condition whereas Solovay randomness is really the strongest
one. So big indeed that for Solovay reals you need to work in set theory, not
merely in recursion theory, and even worse, you have to consider two models
of set theory, say M1 and an inner submodel M2 with the same ordinals. . .
Q: You mean transfinite ordinals?
A: Yes, 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, . . . , ω + ω (which is ω.2) an so on:
ω.3, . . . , ω.ω (which is ω2) , . . . , ω3, . . . , ωω, . . .
In a model of set theory, you have reals and may consider Borel sets, i.e. sets
obtained from rational intervals via iterated countable unions and countable
intersections.
Thus, you have reals in M1 and reals in M2 and every M2 real is also in
M1. You also have Borel sets defined in M2. And to each such Borel set
X2 corresponds a Borel set X1 in M1 with the same definition (well, some
work is necessary to get a precise meaning, but it’s somewhat intuitive).
One can show that X2 ⊆ X1 and that X1,X2 have the very same measure,
which is necessarily a real in M2. Such a Borel set X1 in M1 will be called
a M2-coded Borel set.
Now, a real r in M1 is Solovay random over M2 if it lies in no measure zero
M2-coded Borel set of M1. Such a real r can not lie in the inner model M2
because {r} is a measure zero Borel set and if r were in M2 then {r} would
be M2-coded and r should be outside it, a contradiction.
In caseM1 is big enough relative toM2 it can contain reals which are Solovay
random over M2. It’s a rather tough subject, but you see:
— Martin-Lo¨f random reals are reals outside all c.e. Gδ sets (i.e. intersection
of an c.e. sequence of open sets) constructively of measure zero. In other
words, outside a very smooth countable family of Borel sets. Such Borel sets
are, in fact, coded in any inner submodel of set theory.
— Solovay random reals over a submodel of set theory are reals outside every
measure zero Borel set coded in that submodel. Thus Solovay random reals
can not be in the inner submodel. They may or may not exist, depending
on how big is M1 relative to M2.
Q: What a strange theory. What about the motivations?
A: Solovay introduced random reals in set theory at the pionneering time
of independence results in set theory, using the method of forcing invented
by Paul J. Cohen. That was in the 60’s. He used them to get a model of
set theory in which every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable [44].
Q: Wow! it’s getting late.
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A: Hope you are not exhausted.
Q: I really enjoyed talking with you on such a topic.
Note. The best reference to the subject are
• Li & Vitanyi’s book [30]
• Downey & Hirschfeldt’s book [13]
Caution: In these two books, C,K denote what is here – and in many papers
– denoted K,H.
Among other very useful references: [3], [12], [17], [40] and [46].
Gregory Chaitin’s papers are available on his home page.
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